Iowa State University - Fall 2025 CDC
Out of 10+ Teams
Final Score
As the competition approached finals, I took the leadership role, designing and implementing our three-tier segmented network architecture, creating comprehensive white team documentation (93/100), and leading malware removal efforts across all systems. Our strategic network design isolated critical infrastructure from the UNTRUSTED network where Red Team had physical access, significantly limiting their lateral movement capabilities.
I designed and implemented a three-tier network segmentation strategy that became the cornerstone of our defensive posture. This architecture enforced strict security boundaries through OPNsense firewall rules and isolated systems based on trust level and function.
Purpose: Critical infrastructure and security monitoring
Systems: Active Directory (10.10.10.10), management systems
Security Policy:
Rationale: Compromise of AD would allow Red Team to pivot to all domain-joined machines, so we isolated it behind the strictest firewall rules.
Purpose: Production services and employee workstations
Systems: Web servers, News API, Journalist Desktop
Security Policy:
Rationale: Prevents lateral movement if public-facing services are compromised. Attackers gaining access to web servers are blocked from reaching AD or management infrastructure.
Purpose: IoT devices with physical access vulnerability
Systems: Lobby TV, Weather Station
Security Policy (Most Restrictive):
Rationale: This is our most critical security control. Red Team had physical console access to Lobby TV via vCenter. If they compromised it, they could not pivot to AD or management systems, preventing the most dangerous attack path.
Challenge: Gateway (64.39.3.254) was not on the same Layer 2 segment as our WAN IPs (all /32 host routes)
Solution:
We identified and fixed four high-severity vulnerabilities in the news website and weather backend applications that could have allowed complete system compromise.
Location: weather-backend/backend.go, POST /weather endpoint
Vulnerability: SQL queries constructed using string formatting with unsanitized user input, allowing arbitrary SQL command injection
Remediation: Replaced all string-formatted queries with parameterized SQL statements using placeholders. Database driver now properly escapes all user input.
Impact: Prevented potential data extraction, weather record modification, and database administrative operations
Location: news-website/nuxt.config.ts and app/pages/weather.vue
Vulnerability: API key flag exposed in public runtime configuration, accessible via browser developer tools and JavaScript bundle inspection
Remediation: Moved API key to private server-side configuration. Created new server-side API route (/server/api/weather.ts) that handles backend authentication. Client now makes requests to our API route instead of directly to backend.
Impact: Protected sensitive credentials from client-side exposure while maintaining website functionality
Location: weather-backend/backend.go, POST /weather endpoint
Vulnerability: Weather data upload endpoint had no authentication, allowing unauthorized users to inject arbitrary data into database
Remediation: Implemented API key validation on POST handler. Endpoint checks for valid x-api-key-flag header and rejects requests without proper authentication with 401 Unauthorized.
Impact: Prevented data corruption and manipulation of forecasts displayed on website and Lobby TV broadcast
Location: weather-backend/backend.go and news-website/server/db.ts
Vulnerability: Database credentials and API keys hardcoded in source code, creating exposure risk via version control, backups, and code repositories
Remediation: Refactored applications to read credentials from environment variables. Created systemd service override files at /etc/systemd/system/*.service.d/override.conf that securely store credentials using Environment directive.
Impact: Enabled credential rotation without code changes and eliminated version control exposure
I led comprehensive threat hunting activities across all systems, identifying and removing numerous Red Team persistence mechanisms. Our systematic approach checked multiple layers where attackers commonly establish backdoors.
Finding: Windows Update service completely disabled on Active Directory server (error 0x80070422)
Impact: Windows Server 2019 base installation vulnerable to:
Remediation: Re-enabled Windows Update service and initiated installation of critical security patches
Place (out of 10+ teams)
Total Score
White Team Documentation
Service Availability
Usability Score
Person Team
Systems Defended
Hours Competed
Leading the team through the C3 2025 CDC provided invaluable insights into enterprise network defense and incident response: